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Australia’s proposed Banking Executive 
Accountability Regime: Regulatory 
panopticon or fail-safe? 
It is difficult to ignore the 
widespread concern over 
the corporate culture of 
Australia's banking industry. 
This growing concern has 
led to close scrutiny of 
banks and subsequently 
triggered the Australian 
Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) to 
regulate what it deems as 
bad corporate culture. 
The resulting independent initiatives 
of the Australian Bankers Association 
(ABA) Code of Conduct reviews and 
recommendations have attempted 
to address the issue. The July 2017 
Federal Treasury’s consultation paper 
is currently seeking to introduce a 
Banking Executive Accountability 
Regime (BEAR) providing Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA) with powers to enforce a new 
regulatory regime. The August 2017 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(CBA) allegation of multi-million 
dollar money-laundry activity through 
intelligent bank deposit machines has 
sounded more alarm bells in relation to 
the alleged lack of cultural risk. 
Under the BEAR proposed regime, 
Australia's bank executives would be 
required to take responsibility for their 
corporate culture. This is an attempt to 
restore the trust and integrity lost due 
to a number of financial organisations 
behaving inappropriately.1 It has been 
suggested that the erosion of trust 
in finance forces renewed reflection 
on how to mediate the relationship 
between state and market and the 
role to be played by the corporation.2  
Kingsford-Smith, Clarke and Rogers 
observes: 
 ‘[W]hilst lately more attention is being 
given to responsible persons or 
managers, the calibre of personnel, 
and 'risk culture' in regulatory 
standards, it is still mainly seen as 
an entity requirement to have proper 
capabilities and resources, not a 
question of individual ethical or legal 
responsibility. This concentration 
on entity regulation is one of the 
myriad structural features that act 
as obstacles to professionalism in 
banking.’3
Analysis of Australian Banking 
Industry Report 
The ABA’s Independent Review of 
the Code of Banking Practice (the 
Code), along with its February 2017 
amendments have been described 
as designed primarily to facilitate 
enhanced voluntary engagement 
rather than perform an investigatory or 
punitive function.4 This is evident in one 
of the Code’s key recommendations:
• Signatory banks’ websites should 
provide an easily navigable, clear 
link to the Code, with links from the 
obvious places such as customer 
service and complaints information. 
They should no longer be required to 
display the Code at branches.
• When looking at 
banking regulation, 
disclosure, or standard 
form contracts, it 
is clear the self-
regulatory system in 
Australia has failed. 
• Under the BEAR 
proposed regime, 
Australia's bank 
executives would 
be required to take 
responsibility for their 
corporate culture. 
• It is difficult to 
determine if the 
proposed BEAR 
would curb conduct 
risk of banks and 
bank executives as 
it is still too early to 
point to evidence 
from other 
jurisdictions.
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• In order to maximise the message of 
change to customers, signatory banks 
should look at ways of coordinating 
publicity and messaging about the 
implementation of the new Code.5
Given the historic failure of self-
regulatory initiative codes (first 
introduced in 1996) it has been difficult 
to deter or prevent scandal. It is not 
surprising that the self-regulatory 
approach by the ABA is not enough to 
restore public confidence. Australia’s 
bankers are not in a position to be 
professionalised,6 in the same way 
as lawyers and accountants. The 
ABA does not have powers similar 
to other professional bodies to bind 
their members or compel them to face 
disciplinary hearings or the possibility 
of expulsion and is by no means a body 
that can be left to measure and report its 
own failures moving forward. The Code 
would not, in our opinion, be enough of 
an initiative to restore public trust.
In the last few years there has 
been evidence of conduct involving 
calculated deceit and the intention to 
carry on in this manner has been the 
main motivating factor for the public’s 
outcry.7 Prime Minister Turnbull’s 
criticisms8 reflect a familiar litany 
of financial scandals in Australia 
characterised by poor, indeed 
sometimes deceptive and illegal, 
behaviour by financial professionals 
seemingly unfazed by the deterrent 
capacities of existing penalties. The 
roll call of infamy includes many well-
known names.9 The government’s 
support for the need to change has 
been public and vocal from the outset. 
Whether looking at banking regulation, 
disclosure, or standard form contracts, 
the self-regulatory system in Australia 
has failed. 
Commentators have remarked that 
the government and all political 
persuasions, both state and federal, 
have not adequately protected 
consumers from being abused by 
dishonest and unconscionable actions 
by the banks.10 The government has 
since announced in its 2017–18 
Budget comprising a comprehensive 
package of reforms the need to 
address the recommendations of 
the Coleman Report. As part of this 
package, the government announced 
that it will legislate to introduce 
registration of directors and senior 
executives with APRA. The registration 
would be providing maps of their 
roles and responsibilities. These are 
new powers and penalties afforded to 
APRA allowing them to remove senior 
executives from the APRA-regulated 
institutions and powers to issue civil 
penalties and variable remuneration. 
The proposed new Banking 
Executive Accountability Regime 
(BEAR)
On 15 September 2016, the Federal 
Treasurer requested the House of 
Representative’s Standing Committee 
on Economics to undertake an inquiry 
into Australia’s banks. In November 
that year the inquiry published a report 
(Coleman Report). In this report’s 
chair’s foreword states that:11
 ‘The culture of Australia’s financial 
sector also needs to be reformed. 
While significant changes have been 
announced that will better protect 
consumers, not enough has been 
done to force banks’ senior leaders 
to change their behaviour. When 
consumers are continually let down, 
senior executives should go.’
One of the recommendations in the 
report states that:12
 ‘The committee recommends that, by 
1 July 2017, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission ASIC 
require Australian Financial Services 
License holders to publicly report 
on any significant breaches of their 
licence obligations within five business 
days of reporting the incident to ASIC, 
or within five business days of ASIC or 
another regulatory body identifying  
the breach.
 This proposed report should include:
• a description of the breach and how 
it occurred
• the steps that will be taken to 
ensure that it does not occur again
• the names of the senior executives 
responsible for the team/s where 
the breach occurred
• the consequences for those senior 
executives and, if the relevant 
senior executives were not 
terminated, why termination was 
not pursued.’
The government’s response in May 
2017 was to introduce the legislation 
on what it calls the Banking Executive 
Accountability Regime (BEAR).13 
According to the consultation paper 
released by the Australian Federal 
Treasury the aim of BEAR is, ‘[t]o 
…the erosion of trust in finance 
forces renewed reflection on how 
to mediate the relationship 
between state and market and 
the role to be played by the 
corporation.
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apply a heightened responsibility and 
accountability framework to the most 
senior and influential directors and 
executives within authorised deposit 
taking institutions (ADIs), rather than 
replacing or changing the existing 
prudential framework or directors’ 
duties.’14 BEAR is expected to improve 
conduct by setting a standard of 
behaviour and deterring inappropriate 
conduct.15
Furthermore, it will require key senior 
personnel to be registered and the 
accountability of these individuals to 
be mapped.16 The purpose according to 
the consultation paper is as follows:17
• to help ensure that if an individual 
is not suitable or has been found 
not to have met the expectations of 
an accountable person in the past, 
he or she is not registered as an 
accountable person 
• to promote a clear understanding of 
the responsibilities of accountable 
persons on an individual level and the 
allocation of responsibilities across 
an ADI group or subgroup 
• to make it easier to hold an individual 
to account if he or she does not meet 
new expectations within the activities 
or business of ADI group or subgroup 
for which he or she is responsible. 
More important accountable persons 
are expected to:18
• act with integrity, due skill, care 
and diligence and be open and co-
operative with APRA 
• take reasonable steps to ensure that: 
-  the activities or business of the ADI 
for which they are responsible are 
controlled effectively 
-  the activities or business of the 
ADI for which they are responsible 
comply with relevant regulatory 
requirements and standards 
-  any delegations of responsibilities 
are to an appropriate person and 
those delegated responsibilities are 
discharged effectively 
-  these expectations and 
accountabilities of the BEAR are 
applied and met in the activities 
or business of the ADI group 
or subgroup for which they are 
responsible. 
To ensure that this new regime has 
‘bite’, it is proposed that APRA should 
be able to seek a civil penalty, if an ADI 
fails to meet the new expectations of 
banks, and hold accountable persons 
to account if they do not appropriately 
adhere to the expectations of 
‘accountable persons’ under BEAR.
In comparison with ASIC, APRA’s track 
record in enforcement is not strong. 
It is expected that stronger powers 
for APRA will build on their existing 
prudential regulatory framework in 
addition to ASIC’s existing powers 
for regulating market conduct. 
There is no doubt, however, that the 
implementation of this new regime 
will be challenging. Under questioning 
during Senate estimates, APRA 
chairman, Wayne Byres confirmed the 
challenges confronting the regulator in 
seeking to implement the new regime 
announced by the Treasurer, Scott 
Morrison in the Budget. Byres said he 
did not believe the process was likely 
to be straightforward, ‘Like all of these 
things, the devil is in the detail. You are 
dealing with individuals' employment 
arrangements and there will be all sorts 
of complexities associated with things 
that are already in train that people 
have entitlements to.’19
Even more challenging will be the bank 
executives registered under BEAR. It 
would be like navigating in the dark 
because there is no equivalent in 
Australia. The only jurisdiction around 
the world is the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, it is imperative we examine 
SMR to appreciate and foretell the 
expectations of BEAR. 
Expectations under the United 
Kingdom's SMR
The Senior Managers Regime (SMR) 
came into effect on the 7 March 
2016 and is applicable to all banks 
and insurance companies. However, 
like all new regulatory regimes with 
no enforcement record, it is difficult 
to come to terms with what SMR 
encompasses. As a guide, the Financial 
Conduct Authority published its own 
version of how the SMR is applied to 
their senior managers. The document 
is 102 pages long. 
SMR, at its heart, is an attempt to guide 
banks and other financial institutions, 
‘[t]o raise standards of governance, 
increase individual accountability 
and help restore confidence in the 
banking sector.’20 It does so by 
providing recommendations of role and 
structure — a series of Management 
Responsibilities Maps; senior manager 
statements of responsibilities 
delineated by senior management 
function (SMF). Each of these SMFs 
have a series of allocated, prescribed 
and overall responsibilities. The FCA 
have also mined this down to examine 
details of:
1. individuals and their roles. For 
example, the Director of Strategy 
and Competition; to whom he/she 
reports to; their employment status; 
and other FCA Directorships
2. governance and management 
arrangements. For example, 
committees and committee 
structures
3. statements of responsibility. 
For example, role titles, such as 
Executive Committee Director, 
Enforcement and Market Oversight; 
their SMF; the main purpose of the 
role; and the key committees of 
which they are members.
This is a highly intricate and guided 
attempt to govern the structure and 
activities of senior managers. However, 
there is very little detail concerning how 
the SMR might even begin to modify 
leader behaviour and subsequently 
change corporate culture. Jonathan 
Davidson the Director of Supervision of 
the FCA comments that,
 ‘Changing culture is very difficult and 
we know it takes time. Why is this? It’s 
…the time is ripe for a 
more robust method 
of dealing with poor 
corporate culture.
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because culture comes from the past. 
CEOs, boards, programmes, systems 
and controls come and go regularly. 
Mindsets are developed and reinforced 
over years and even decades and are 
passed down from one generation to 
the next… So, the stakes are high and 
we are and will be paying very close 
attention to the culture of firms and 
what boards and management are 
doing to shape the culture, of which 
governance is a key factor.’21
However, in both the UK and Australian 
context we need to be clear that what 
drives leaders and the climate in which 
they operate are far more fluid than 
the law envisages and stipulates. It 
is clear that the FCA views culture as 
a contributing factor to why banks 
behave badly. Andrew Bailey, who 
was then the chief executive of the 
Prudential Regulation Authority 
said in his speech in May 2016 that, 
‘Culture has thus laid the ground for 
bad outcomes, for instance where 
management are so convinced of their 
rightness that they hurtle for the cliff 
without questioning the direction of 
travel.’22 However, before adopting and 
adapting how the SMR could regulate 
the culture of banks in an Australian 
context, it is pertinent to discuss what 
this banking culture is and whether it 
can be regulated. Similarly, the role 
of leaders needs to be more deeply 
analysed. For example, Liu argues that, 
 ‘Despite the relative buoyancy of the 
local economy and strong performance 
of the major banks in Australia, the 
findings show how some banking chief 
executive officers were able to exploit 
the GFC by co-constructing with the 
media vivid, compelling narratives 
of their leadership in delivering their 
banks from “crisis”.’23
Conclusion
The initiatives proposed to be adopted 
to clean up the purported bad culture in 
Australia’s banking industry are entering 
new territory, from a regulatory and 
political perspective. However, it appears 
that the time is ripe for a more robust 
method of dealing with poor corporate 
culture. The CBA case study with 
AUSTRAC and other Federal agencies is 
heavily relying upon the role of the media 
and of the chair of the board and CEO to 
explain the lack of culture.
In reality it is difficult to determine 
if the proposed BEAR would curb 
conduct risk of banks and bank 
executives without much evidence 
from the UK. One thing is certain, 
the regulatory proposals, place 
considerable burdens on bank 
executives to ensure compliance  
is achievable. 
APRA appears to be extending its 
regulatory reach watching over the bank 
executives’ control over the conduct of 
the those who work for the organisation. 
In short, APRA is ‘watching the watchers’ 
through a set of rules acting as an 
invisible panopticon. Getting the balance 
correct is the real achievement — the 
evidence is clear that self-regulation 
does not work due to self-interest, but 
over-regulation, such as the US response 
in Sarbanes-Oxley type legislation is a 
huge cost to business and regulation. Let 
us hope that the Australian government 
will learn from other jurisdictions and get 
the balance optimal.   
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G.Borsellino@westernsydney.edu.au. 
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